## Learning from and about others: when reasoning about testimony, children consider both where it came from, and what others believe about its source

Rosie Aboody ${ }^{\text {a,b, }}$, Sami R. Yousif , Sarah Joo ${ }^{\text {d }}$, Mark Sheskine, \& Frank C. Keil ${ }^{f}$
${ }^{a}$ MIT, ${ }^{b}$ Harvard University, ${ }^{c}$ University of Pennsylvania, dPrinceton University, ${ }^{e}$ Minerva University, ${ }^{\dagger}$ Yale University

## Introduction

$>$ We often witness others' interactions as a $3^{\text {rd }}$ party. An ability to make epistemic inferences from these interactions could be a critical component of our social cognition.
> However, little research has investigated how children learn about others (and the world) from observing others' interactions.
> Do 4- to 6-year-olds notice whom others believe, and infer the epistemic causes behind doubt? Do adults form their own beliefs by observing whom others trust?

## Procedure

Experiment 1: Sam (pink) wants to know what's in the boxes. Each agent tells him what's in a box. Sam accepts one agent's testimony, and questions the other's.


Expt 1 test q: Sam thinks one of these friends is wrong. Which friend is wrong?
Experiment 2a-2b (adults): More tightly controlled, contrasting an information-seeking and a pointed question.


Expt 2a test q: Sam thinks one of these friends is wrong. Which friend is wrong? Expt 2 b test q : To find out what's in the yellow box, you can ask one person what's there. Who do you want to ask?

## Results

Expt 1: Sam thinks one of these friends is wrong. Who's wrong? $(n=90)$



Expt 2a:
Who does Sam
Expt 2b: think is wrong?

Who do you want


## General Discussion

> From age 5 , kids notice whom others trust, inferring that an agent disbelieves an informant he pointedly questions
$>$ Adults make the same inference in a more tightly controlled setting, but also infer a person who was disbelieved may in fact be ignorant.
> This opens a new area of research, investigating how we learn about others and the world from observing interactions as a $3^{\text {rd }}$ party.
$>$ It also opens an important question: can we distinguish disbelief that arises from true evidence of epistemic incompetence vs. bias? What are our underlying assumptions over the reasons for others' distrust?

